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I. Introduction
Wellwood Avenue is home to two of the best pizza parlors in the town of
Lindenhurst, Carlo's and Giuseppe's. The two stores engage in heavy
competition, but both have been consistently profitable. Last year, though,
Carlo's began advertising its new "Healthy Pizza"-a pizza with zero grams of
fat that tastes just like Carlo's traditional pizzas. Carlo's advertises its amazing
new product throughout the town. The Healthy Pizza becomes the talk of
Lindenhurst, and soon Carlo's profits have quadrupled. Giuseppe's, on the
other hand, is floundering since the debut of the Healthy Pizza.
After three months of incredibly poor sales, Giuseppe's becomes desperate
to discover the secret behind the Healthy Pizza and sends a sample of the
amazing product to a laboratory to discover its ingredients. After performing
some tests, the laboratory informs Giuseppe's that there is no secret ingredient
in the Healthy Pizza-the pizza has just as many grams of fat as a typical pizza.
Carlo's has been selling the same product it has always sold, just advertising it
to be something different. Giuseppe's alerts the local media of the scam, and
soon after, Giuseppe's sales return to what they were prior to the unveiling of
the Healthy Pizza.
Giuseppe's, however, feels that Carlo's should compensate it for the sales
it lost due to the Healthy Pizza, and retains an attorney to sue Carlo's. The
attorney performs some research and discovers Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act,' which seems tailor-made to protect a party like Giuseppe's. The attorney
1. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000) (providing a federal cause of action for false
advertising). The relevant portion of the statute is the following:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container
for goods, uses in commerce any... false or misleading description of fact, or false

FILTERING THROUGHA MESS

1675

files suit in the federal district court in Lindenhurst, expecting the case to be an
easy win. However, the case becomes complicated when Carlo's submits a
motion to dismiss, arguing that Giuseppe's lacks standing to sue under Section
43(a)'s false advertising protection. The district court is located in a circuit that
has yet to determine a standard for prudential standing in Section 43(a) false
advertising claims. The court, therefore, turns to the Section 43(a) false
advertising standing jurisprudence of other circuits. After examining the
decisions in which other circuits have developed standards for standing in
Section 43(a) claims, the district court determines that Giuseppe's does not
have standing to sue. Despite the fact that under the plain meaning of Section
43(a) Giuseppe's standing would seem apparent,2 the district court, through
examining the Section 43(a) standing jurisprudence of the other circuits, is able
to find that Giuseppe's lacks standing to make a Section 43(a) false advertising
claim against Carlo's.
The above hypothetical may seem unrealistic, but the Eleventh Circuit's
recent ruling in Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.,3 which
or misleading representation of fact, which.., in commercial advertising or
promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin
of his or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be
liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is likely to be
damaged by such act.
Id.
2. The plain meaning being that "any person who believes that he or she is likely to be
damaged" by the false advertising may pursue a claim against the party allegedly engaging in the
false advertising. Id. Here, Giuseppe's is not just a person who "believes" that the false
advertising damaged it; it is a party that clearly was damaged by the false advertisements
disseminated by Carlo's. Courts, however, rarely have interpreted "any person" language in a
statutory standing provision to mean literally any person. See infra note 22 and accompanying
text (discussing cases where "any person" language in a statute was interpreted to require the
plaintiff to be more than just a person to have standing).
3. See Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1173 (1 1th Cir.
2007) (finding that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring a Section 43(a) false advertising
claim under an application of the Conte Bros. test, despite the fact that the plaintiff's business
was in direct competition with the defendant's business). In Phoenix,a Burger King franchisee
brought a Section 43(a) false advertising suit against McDonald's on behalf of himself and all
similarly situated Burger King franchisees. Id. at 1160. The basis of the suit was a scandal
involving the promotional games that McDonald's offered between 1995 and 2001. Id. at
1159-60. In these promotional games, McDonald's offered high-value prizes, including
automobiles and cash prizes up to one million dollars. Id. at 1159. McDonald's advertised
"that all customers who participated in the games had a fair and equal opportunity to win the
offered prizes." Id. In actuality, however, customers did not have a fair and equal opportunity
to win the high-value prizes because the Director of Security at the firm that McDonald's had
hired to operate the games had devised and implemented a scheme that "diverted at least $20
million in high-value prizes" away from McDonald's customers and to his cohorts who shared
the embezzled prizes with him. Id. at 1160. The Burger King franchisee argued that
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prevented a Burger King franchisee from suing McDonald's for alleged false
advertising under Section 43(a), lends it credibility.4 If rulings like the one
against the Burger King franchisee become common, Section 43(a)'s protection
against false advertising effectively will become a dead letter. This is troubling
not only to commercial players who rely on Section 43(a) to prevent their
competitors from engaging in activities like that in which Carlo's engaged, but
also to consumers who are protected indirectly from false advertising by the
liability Section 43(a) places on those who engage in false advertising. A clear
standard for standing in Section 43(a) false advertising claims that can easily be
applied in a consistent manner and is true to the plain meaning of the statute's
language is, therefore, necessary.
The goal of this Note is to establish that the current state of Section 43(a)
false advertising standing jurisprudence is unstable and that this instability in
the law is troubling because it permits courts to reach outcomes which remove
the teeth from Section 43(a)'s false advertising protection. Part II provides an
explanation of standing in general. Part III gives a history of the Lanham Act,
particularly its false advertising protection. Part IV describes several different
standards for prudential standing that courts have used in Section 43(a) false
advertising claims. Part V explains the problems that result from the existence
of so many different standards. Part VI argues that the U.S. Supreme Court
McDonald's advertisements, representing that all customers had a fair and equal chance to win
the high-value prizes, amounted to false advertising under Section 43(a), due to the
embezzlement scheme. Id. McDonald's countered that the Burger King fianchisee did not have
standing to make a Section 43(a) false advertising claim. Id. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with
McDonald's and found that under the court's newly-adopted standard for standing in Section
43(a) false advertising cases, the Conte Bros. test, the Burger King franchisee did not have
standing. Id. at 1173.
4. See id. at 1173 (denying standing to the plaintiff who was a direct competitor of the
defendant). The Eleventh Circuit stated:
Although Phoenix [the Burger King franchisee] and the class it seeks to represent
[all Burger King franchisees] are McDonald's 'direct competitors,' Phoenix has
alleged a competitive harm to their commercial interests, and there is no
identifiable class of persons that is more proximate to the claimed injury, because
of the attenuated link between the alleged injury and McDonald's alleged
misrepresentations, the speculative nature of the claimed damages, the potential
complexity in apportioning damages, and the significant risk of duplicative
damages, we hold that Phoenix does not have prudential standing to bring a false
advertising claim under the Lanham Act against McDonald's.
Id.
5. See Richard A. De Sevo, ConsumerStanding UnderSection 43(a)-An Issue Whose
Time Has Passed,88 TRADEMARK REP. 1,2 (1998) (arguing that standing under Section 43(a)
does not need to be extended to consumers to protect consumers from false advertising because
"the ever-present threat of litigation by competitors under Section 43(a)... provides more than
sufficient deterrence to false advertising").
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should establish a standard for prudential standing in false advertising claims
brought under Section 43(a) and suggests that the standard should include a
categorical approach filter. Finally, Part VII provides a brief summary of the
Note's analysis.
II. Standing, Generally
To a layperson, standing is the act of"assum[ing] or maintain[ing] an erect
attitude on one's feet,",6 but in the legal field standing refers to a party's ability
to bring a matter before a court for adjudication.7 Regardless of the merits of
the claim, if the party bringing the claim does not have standing, then a court
cannot grant relief.8 The concept of standing is particularly important in federal
causes of action like Section 43(a) false advertising claims because the
Supreme Court has interpreted Article III of the U.S. Constitution as
prohibiting federal courts from hearing claims that are brought to them by
parties that do not meet several standing requirements. 9 The Court, however,
has also imposed additional requirements for establishing standing that go
beyond that which Article III requires.' 0 These additional nonconstitutional
requirements are the requirements for prudential standing."
A. Article III StandingRequirements
While the Section 43(a) standing controversy addressed in this Note does
not involve Article III requirements, a brief discussion of Article III standing
requirements is warranted because prudential standing requirements are largely
6. 16 THE OXFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 491 (2d ed. 1989).
7. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 56 (4th ed. 2003) ("Standing is the
determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to bring a matter to the court for
adjudication.").
8. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?,77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1749
(1999) (stating that if a party does not have standing he or she is denied "access to the courts"
and therefore "cannot prevail in even the most meritorious legal action").
9. See CHEMERINSKY, supranote 7, at 59-60 ("The [Supreme] Court has said that some
of these [standing] requirements are constitutional; that is, they are derived from the Court's
interpretation of Article III and as constitutional restrictions they cannot be overridden by
statute.").
10. See id.
at 60 (stating that the Court has identified principles that are not identified by
the Constitution but must be considered by federal courts when they assess whether a party has
standing as part of "prudent judicial administration").
11. See id. ("In addition to... constitutional requirements, the Court also has identified
three prudential standing principles.").
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irrelevant if the Article III requirements are not met. 12 Article III of the U.S.
Constitution limits the jurisdiction of thejudiciary branch to settling cases and
controversies.' 3 The Court has interpreted this constitutional limit to require a
party to make three allegations in order to establish standing. 14 The party's
claim must allege "that he or she has suffered or imminently will suffer an
injury" (injury), "that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct"
(causation), and "that a favorable federal court decision is likely to redress the
injury" (redressability). 5 Because the Court has interpreted these requirements
as part of the Constitution, Congress cannot abrogate them through the passage
of mere statutes.16
B. PrudentialStandingRequirements
In most Section 43(a) false advertising claims, however, the plaintiff is
able to meet the constitutional standing requirements. 17 The question of
whether a plaintiff has standing in Section 43(a) claims generally has centered
on whether the plaintiff meets the prudential requirements.' 8 Prudential
standing is not a constitutional requirement, and the principles which have
controlled its doctrinal development, therefore, are not based on the
Constitution but rather on "prudent judicial administration."' 19 As prudential
standing requirements do not originate from the Constitution, Congress may
override them through statutory provisions. 20 Courts, however, will presume
12. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (stating that the
Court has established "two strands" of standing requirements that must be met, Article III
standing and prudential standing).
13. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (defining the scope ofjudicial power).
14. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 60 ("[T]he Supreme Court has identified three
constitutional standing requirements.").
15. Id.
16. See id. at 59-60 (stating that standing requirements that are constitutional "cannot be
overridden by statute").
17. See, e.g., Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1162 (11 th
Cir. 2007) (finding that the plaintiff's Section 43(a) claim satisfied constitutional requirements
for standing); Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221,225 (3d Cir.
1998) (same).
18. See, e.g., Phoenix, 489 F.3d at 1173 (finding that the plaintiff in Section 43(a) claim
lacks standing because it cannot meet the prudential requirements of standing); Conte Bros., 165
F.3d at 234-36 (same).
19. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 60.
20. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) ("[U]nlike their constitutional
counterparts, [prudential standing requirements] can be modified or abrogated by Congress.").
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that Congress did not intend to abrogate the requirements ofprudential standing
unless Congress clearly expresses such an intention in the text of the statute.2'
Statutory language that merely states that any person may make a claim
enforcing the statute, like that in Section 43(a), will not necessarily be
considered a clear expression of an intent to abrogate prudential standing
requirements.22 For this reason, courts have been able to dismiss Section 43(a)
claims for lack of standing despite the fact that the text of Section 43(a) states
that "any person who believes that he or she is likely to be damaged 2 3 by an act
of false advertising may bring a civil action against the alleged false advertiser.
While the Supreme Court has yet to define fully the requirements of
prudential standing, 24 it has focused on three principles when discussing
prudential standing. 25 First, a party who asserts the rights of a third party lacks
prudential standing.26 Second, a party may not bring a claim as a taxpayer if
such a claim could be raised by all other taxpayers. 27 Third, the party's claim
must be one that falls within the zone of interests that Congress intended to
address with the statute under which the party is suing.28
Courts developing a standard for prudential standing in Section 43(a)
claims seem to be addressing this third principle because such courts generally
state that their standard is meant to limit the class eligible to bring suit under

21. See id. at 163 (stating that the prudential standing doctrine applies "unless it is
expressly negated"); Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 227 ("As a matter of statutory interpretation,
Congress is presumed to incorporate background prudential standing principles, unless the
statute expressly negates them.").
22. See Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Contractors, 459 U.S.
519, 535 (1983) (finding that prudential limits still apply to the plaintiff's Clayton Act claim
despite the relevant statute's language that "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or
property" had standing to sue); Phoenix,489 F.3d at 1162 (finding that Congress did not intend
to abrogate prudential standing requirements in Section 43(a) claims despite Section 43(a)'s
"anyperson" language); Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 227 (same). But see Bennett, 520 U.S. at 164
(finding that the language "any person may commence a civil suit" in the Endangered Species
Act abrogated prudential standing requirements).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
24. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) ("[Wle have not
exhaustively defined the prudential dimensions of the standing doctrine.").
25. See CHEMERiNSKY, supra note 7, at 60 ("[Tlhe Court... has identified three
prudential standing principles.").
26. See id. ("[A] party generally may assert only his or her own rights and cannot raise the
claims of third parties not before the court.").
27. See id. ("[A] plaintiff may not sue as a taxpayer who shares a grievance in common
with all other taxpayers.").
28. See id. ("[A] party must raise a claim within the zone of interests protected by the
statute in question.").
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Section 43(a) to those who Congress intended to protect. 29 Nonetheless, when
deciding whether a party has prudential standing to sue under Section 43(a),
courts have refused to use the "zone of interests" framework developed by the
Supreme Court.3 °
1. The "Zone ofInterests" Testfor Standing
One reason why courts may not apply the zone of interests test when
assessing standing in Section 43(a) claims is because the Supreme Court has
applied the test in such an inconsistent manner that lower courts, along with
virtually everyone else, cannot discern what the test is and when it should be
applied.3' In Ass 'n ofDataProcessingService Organizations,Inc. v. Camp,32
29. See, e.g., Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 689 n.8 (2d Cir.
1971) (stating that the "proper focus" in deciding whether the plaintiffs in a Section 43(a) claim
had prudential standing was whether the plaintiffs' claims "partake of the nature of the injury
sought to be prevented and/or remedied by Congress through Section 43(a)"); Conte Bros.
Auto., Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 236 (3d Cir. 1998) (implying that the
court's standard for prudential standing in Section 43(a) claims "serve[s] the underlying purpose
of the Lanham Act").
30. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 563 n.49 (5th Cir.
2001) ("This is not an administrative law case.... so standing is not governed by administrative
law's 'zone of interest' test."); Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 226 ("We believe it is more appropriate
to inquire as to the class's statutory standing free from the formalistic constraints of the 'zone of
interests' test and its links to administrative review.").
31. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 100 ("More recent [Supreme Court] cases are
inconsistent in applying the [zone of interests] requirement.").
32. See Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 (1970)
(finding that purveyors of data processing services had standing to challenge the Comptroller of
the Currency's decision to allow banks to provide data processing services to other banks and
bank customers). In Camp, the issue was whether providers of data processing services could
challenge the Comptroller of the Currency's decision to allow banks to provide data processing
services to other banks and to bank customers. Id. at 151. The providers of data processing
services argued that the Comptroller's decision violated Section 4 of the Bank Service
Corporation Act of 1962, which prohibits banks from engaging in any activity other than
providing bank services. Id.at 155. The lower courts had dismissed the providers' suit because
Section 4 did not give the providers standing to challenge the Comptroller's decision. Id.at
151. The Supreme Court found that whether the providers had standing under Section 4
depends on "whether the interest [they] sought to [protect] ...is arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by [Section 4]." Id at 153. After examining the legislative
history of the Bank Service Corporation Act, noting a trend toward "enlarg[ing] . . .the class of
people who may protest administrative action" through the use of statutes, and finding that "the
mere failure to provide specially by statute for judicial review is certainly no evidence of intent
to withhold review," the Court found that the providers did have standing to sue because their
interest at stake was arguably within the zone of interests intended to be protected by Section 4.
Id. at 154-58.
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the Court first announced this requirement for prudential standing. In Camp,
the Court stated that to have prudential standing, a plaintiff must be seeking to
protect an interest that "is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected
or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."33 Slightly
less than two decades later in Clarke v. SecuritiesIndustry Ass 'n,34 the Court
made it clear that this test was not meant to be "especially demanding" and that
a plaintiff could have standing to sue under a statute even if there was "no
indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff. 3 5 While
the Court adhered to this permissive formulation of the test in Bennett v.
Spear3 6 and National Credit Union Administration v. FirstNationalBank &
Trust Co., 3 7 the Court construed the test more strictly in Air Courier
Conference v. American Postal Workers Union38 and found that the postal
33.

Id. at 153.

34. See Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 403 (1987) (finding that a trade
association representing securities brokers, underwriters, and investment bankers had standing
to challenge the Comptroller of the Currency's decision that a bank office offering discount
brokerage services was not a branch under the National Bank Act). In Clarke, a trade
association for the securities industry challenged the Comptroller ofthe Currency's decision that
a bank office which provided discount brokerage services was not a branch under the National
Bank Act, and, therefore, could be opened outside of the bank's home state despite the National
Bank Act's limitation on out-of-state branching. Id. at 392-93. The Comptroller argued that
the trade association lacked standing because its interest was not within the zone of interests that
Congress sought to protect with the National Bank Act. Id. at 393. The Court stated that the
zone of interests test "is not meant to be especially demanding" and should deny a plaintiff
standing only when "the plaintiff's interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the
purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to
permit the suit." Id. at 399. The Court also acknowledged that a plaintiff would fail the zone of
interests test if Congress, within the statute, made "fairly discernable a congressional intent to
preclude review" of claims like that of the plaintiff's. Id. at 403. Finding that the trade
association's interest had "a plausible relationship to the policies underlying [the National Bank
Act]" and that there was no "fairly discernible. . . congressional intent to preclude review" of
claims like the trade association's, the Court held that the trade association had standing to
challenge the Comptroller's ruling. Id.
35. Id. at 399-400.
36. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164 (1997) (finding that ranch operators and
irrigation districts that objected to a restriction on lake levels imposed to protect endangered
species of fish had standing to make a claim under the citizen-suit provision of the Endangered
Species Act because they fell within the provision's zone of interests).
37. See Nat'l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 499
(1998) (finding that commercial banks had standing under Section 109 of the Federal Credit
Union Act to object to the expansion of the class of parties who could become members of
credit unions because its interests were arguably within the zone of interests that Section 109
was intended to protect).
38. See Air Courier Conference v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517,530 (1991)
(finding that postal workers did not have standing to object to the Postal Service's suspension of
its monopoly on certain routes because the workers were not within the zone of interests that
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workers' union lacked standing to challenge the Postal Service's suspension of
its monopoly over certain routes, which arguably violated the Postal Express
Statutes, because the "particular language of the statutes" did not show a
congressional intention "to protect jobs with the Postal Service."39 Air Courier,
therefore, conflicts with Clarke, and for this reason lower courts may be
confused as to the scope of the zone of interests test.
The more probable reason for why lower courts have not used the
Supreme Court's zone of interests framework when developing standards for
Section 43(a) prudential standing is because they believe that the test applies
only when a party is challenging an administrative agency's action. 40 While
this formulation of the test contradicts the Court's articulation of the test in
Camp,41 in Conte Bros. Automotive, Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc.,42 the
Third Circuit explicitly embraced it.43 The Conte Bros. court found that it
could look beyond the zone of interests test when establishing requirements for
prudential standing in Section 43(a) false advertising claims because the "zone
of interests test developed in the administrative law context." 44 In its
subsequent exploration outside the zone of interests test, the Conte Bros. court
found that for the purposes of "determining statutory standing outside of the
administrative context," it need not give the "liberal tilt toward recognizing
standing," which the zone of interests test affords claimants.45 Other lower
courts, which have decided not to apply the zone of interests test and the tilt
toward recognition of standing that comes along with it, have not been as
forthcoming as the Conte Bros. court in stating their reasons for not applying

Congress sought to protect when it passed the statute that granted the monopoly to the Postal
Service).

39. Id. at 524-25.
40. See CHEMERINSKY, supranote 7, at 102 ("There is a strong argument that the zone of
interests test is an additional standing requirement only in cases seeking review of agency

decisions under the Administrative Procedures Act.").

41. See Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)
(implying that the zone of interests test applies to whatever "statute or constitutional guarantee
[that is] in question"). Camp's articulation does not seem to limit the zone of interests test to

just administrative law cases. Id.

42. See Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221,233 (3d Cir.
1998) (adopting a five-prong test for determining standing in Section 43(a) claims).

43. See id. at 226 (stating that outside of the administrative law context, the zone of
interests test is not controlling as to whether a plaintiff has prudential standing to sue under a
statute).
44. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

45. Id.
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the test, but one could hypothesize that they also believe that the test applies
only to administrative law claims. 4
Regardless of the reason for why lower courts have declined to apply the
Supreme Court's zone of interests standards when establishing prudential
standing standards for Section 43(a) claims, the effect generally has been the
same-the establishment of a standard which is tougher to meet than the zone
of interests test. Usually, these other standards are more difficult to meet
because their development is based on an assumption that an "indication of
congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff' 47 is necessary for a
plaintiff to establish prudential standing, a requirement which the Clarke court
stated was not necessary to establish standing.
II1. False Advertising Protection Under the Lanham Act
It is debatable whether congressional intent should matter in developing
prudential standing standards for Section 43(a) false advertising claims. Yet,
because courts so often rely on congressional intent when establishing such
standards,48 the history of the Lanham Act's false advertising protection in
Section 43(a) remains relevant.
A. The OriginalEnactment of the Lanham Act
Prior to the passage of the Lanham Act in 1948, Congress had passed
several other statutes intended to regulate trademarks,49 but these acts proved to

46. But see Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 563 (5th Cir. 2001)
(stating that the zone of interests test does not apply in Section 43(a) claims because such claims
are not administrative law cases).
47. Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399-400 (1987).
48. See, e.g., Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1177-78 (3d Cir. 1993)
(examining the legislative history of the 1988 amendment to Section 43(a)); Colligan v.
Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 689-90 (2d Cir. 1971) (looking briefly at the
Lanham Act's legislative history in regards to Section 43(a) and then deeming it
"inconclusive"); L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1954)
("We find nothing in the legislative history of the Lanham Act to justify the view that [Section
43(a)] is merely declarative of existing law.").
49. See 1 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 5:3 (4th ed. 1996) (providing a history of federal trademark legislation leading up to passage
of the Lanham Act); Ethan Horwitz & Benjamin Levi, Fifty Years of the Lanham Act: A
Retrospective ofSection 43(a), 7 FORD-AM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 59,60-63 (1996)

(same).

1684

65 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1673 (2008)

be inadequate. 50 One purpose of the Lanham Act was essentially to reenact
these prior statutes in a manner that would give them the teeth that Congress
originally intended them to have. 51 The Lanham Act was also a response to the
seminal case of Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins which effectively eliminated
federal common law, including that which had developed to regulate
trademarks and unfair competition.53 Congress enacted the Lanham Act to
codify the common law that Erie had eliminated.54
The portion of the Lanham Act that pertains to this discussion is located in
Section 43(a) and is the following:
Any person who shall ...use in connection with any goods or services...
any false description or representation.., shall be liable to a civil
action... by any person who believes that he or she is likely to be damaged
by the use of any such false description or representation.

During the development and eventual passage of the Lanham Act, this
provision, and Section 43(a) as a whole, received little attention.5 6 Congress
regarded Section 43(a) as "a minor, but useful section," 57 whose primary
purpose was to codify the federal common law of unfair trade practices that had
developed prior to Erie.58 Courts, initially, interpreted Section 43(a) in a
similar light, allowing it to be used only in "situations akin to traditional
50. See IMCCARTHY, supra note 49, § 5:3 ("[E]ven with the 1920 amendments, the basic
1905 [federal] Trademark Act remained inadequate to cope with the realities of twentieth
century commerce and brand names."); Jean Wegman Bums, ConfusedJurisprudence: False
Advertising Underthe Lanham Act, 79 B.U. L. REv. 807, 812 (1999) (stating that "changes in

commerce and business" had rendered the pre-Lanham Act federal trademark statutes
inadequate).
51. See Horwitz & Levi, supra note 49, at 63 (stating that the Lanham Act was passed to
solve the problems caused by earlier federal trademark statutes).
52. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (eliminating the "federal
general common law").
53. See Bums, supranote 50, at 812-13 ("[T]he Supreme Court's 1938 decision in Erie
Railroadv. Tompkins, which eliminated the doctrine of federal common law, arguably left
trademark protection to state-by-state interpretation-a prospect Congress saw as unacceptable
given the interstate nature of twentieth century commerce.").
54. See id. at 813-14 (suggesting that a purpose of the Lanham Act was to codify the
federal common law relevant to trademarks).
55. Lanham Act § 43(a), 60 Stat. 427, 441 (1946) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(2000)).
56. See Bums, supra note 50, at 813 ("Congress ...did not view Section 43(a) as a

critical section.").
57.

Id.

58. See id.at 813-14 ("The scant legislative history for Section 43(a) suggests that
Congress was, as with the trademark sections of the [Lanham] Act, reacting to the Eriedecision,
which had eliminated the federal common law of unfair trade practices ....).
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trademark infringement." 59 It was not until the 1954 case ofL "AiglonApparel,
Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc.60 that courts began to recognize that Section 43(a)
created a new statutory tort of false advertising.6
B. Expansion of Section 43(a) to False Advertising
In L 'Aiglon, the Second Circuit explicitly rejected the notion that Section
62
43(a) is only applicable in cases involving traditional trademark infringement.
The defendants in L 'Aiglon argued that the plaintiffs could not make a claim
under Section 43(a) because they could not prove that "palming off' had
occurred.63 In other words, the plaintiff could not prove that the defendant's
misrepresentation caused or was likely to cause consumers to purchase
defendant's products with the mistaken belief that they were purchasing the
plaintiff's product.64 As "palming off' was a necessary component of
59. Id. at 816.
60. See L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1954)
(finding that Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act created "a statutory civil wrong of false
representation of goods in commerce"). In L'Aiglon, the plaintiff, a dress designer, sold a
"distinctively styled dress" nationwide. Id. at 650. The plaintiffs advertisements for this dress
included a picture of the distinctive dress next to its price, $17.95. Id. The defendant sold a
dress through mail order that was similar to the plaintiff's dress, but was "much inferior to
plaintiff's in quality and notably different in appearance." Id. In its advertisements, the
defendant used a picture of the plaintiff's dress next to the price of its dress, $6.95. Id. The
plaintiff argued that this was a violation of the plain meaning of the language of Section 43(a)
because the defendant's actions were "about as plain a use of false representation in the
description of goods sold in commerce as could be imagined." Id. The defendant countered
that Congress only intended for Section 43(a) to codify the federal common law for unfair
competition, and as the plaintiff would not have recovered for the defendant's action under the
common law, the plaintiff should not be able to recover under Section 43(a) either. Id. The
Third Circuit discounted the defendant's argument as it found no support for the argument in
the Lanham Act's legislative history. Id. at 651. The court, therefore, declared that through
Section 43(a), Congress had created "a statutory civil wrong of false representation of goods in
commerce." Id.
61. See Maury Tepper, FalseAdvertising Claims and the Revision of the LanhamAct: A
Step in Which Direction?,59 U. CN. L. REv. 957, 957 (1991) ("In 1954, eight years after the
passage of the Lanham Act, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit broadened
the scope of Section 43(a) to cover false advertising claims in L 'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana
Lobell, Inc.").
62. See id. ("The L'Aiglon court specifically rejected a restrictive reading of Section
43(a), noting that on its face, the section created a new statutory tort.").
63. SeeL 'Aiglon, 214 F.2d at 651 (explaining the defendant's argument that Section 43(a)
could not be violated unless "'palming off,' narrowly conceived" occurred).
64. See id. (explaining the meaning of "palming off'). For a discussion of how some
courts incorrectly define "palming off," see 4 McCARTHY, supra note 49, § 25:2.
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traditional trademark infringement under federal common law, the defendant
essentially argued that Section 43(a) was just meant to codify the body of
trademark infringement components of the federal common law. 65 The
L 'Aiglon court, however, rejected this argument. The court noted that there
was "nothing in the legislative history of the Lanham Act to justify the view
that ... [Section 43(a) was] merely declarative of existing law [at the time of its
enactment]. 66 The court, finding "no ambiguity in the relevant language in the
statute," concluded the following: "It seems to us that Congress has defined a
statutory civil wrong of false representation of goods in commerce and has
given a broad class of suitors injured or likely to be injured by such wrong the
right to relief in the federal courts., 67 While it would take some time for the bar
to fully take advantage of this ruling,68 L 'Aiglon marked the first opening of the
floodgates for Section 43(a) false advertising claims.69
C. JudicialNarrowing of Section 43(a) "sFalse Advertising Protection
Following L 'Aiglon, while acknowledging that Section 43(a) created a
new federal tort of false advertising, courts attempted to narrow the number of
situations in which the provision could be enforced. For instance, courts
consistently found that Section 43(a) did not apply in situations where the
defendant's advertisements misrepresented the plaintiff's product.7 ° The Third
Circuit first articulated this limitation on Section 43(a) in Bernard Food
Industries, Inc. v. Dietene Co. 71 In Bernard,the Third Circuit followed a
65. See L 'Aiglon, 214 F.2d at 650 ("[I]t is argued, [that] federal courts should so construe
[Section 43(a)] as to preserve.., the judge-made [common law] limitations on liability.").
66. Id. at 651.
67. Id.
68. Judge Clark of the Second Circuit predicted that it may take a while for the bar to
recognize the potential broad applicability of Section 43(a). See Maternally Yours v. Your
Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538, 546 (2d Cir. 1956) (Clark, J., concurring) ("[T]he bar has not yet
realized the potential impact of this statutory provision.").
69. See Bums, supra note 50, at 817 n.46 (explaining that whileL 'Aiglon was the first to
acknowledge that Section 43(a) provided a cause of action for false advertising, such claims
were not made often until the 1970s).
70. See Tepper, supra note 61, at 958 ("Since 1969, courts interpreting Section 43(a) had
consistently limited its application in false advertising claims to misrepresentations concerning
the advertiser's own product.").
71. See Bernard Food Indus., Inc. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279, 1283-84 (7th Cir. 1969)
(limiting the scope of Section 43(a)'s false advertising protection to remedying false
advertisements in which the defendant's alleged false statements describe his or her own
product).
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rationale similar to pre-L 'Aiglon courts that considered the scope of Section
43(a) and found that the Section could only be used to address injuries that
were similar to traditional trademark infringement.72 As one can only be held
liable for trademark infringement involving his or her own product, the
Bernard court found that Section 43(a) could only be used when the
misrepresentation in question was describing the defendant's own product.73
Even after courts abandoned the notion that Section 43(a) claims should be
limited to addressing harms similar to traditional trademark infringement, they
continued to follow the Bernard rule that defendants could only be held
responsible under Section 43(a) for misrepresentations describing their own
products.74
A judicial narrowing of the applicability of Section 43(a) that is more
pertinent to the present discussion, however, is the courts' imposition of various
standing requirements on plaintiffs in Section 43(a) false advertising claims.
While the standing requirements that courts created varied,75 the judiciary
largely agreed that consumers could not take advantage of Section 43(a)'s false
advertising protection. 76 The first major case to consider whether consumers
could bring false advertising claims under Section 43(a) was Colligan v.
Activities Club of New York, Ltd.77
72. See id. at 1283 (stating that Section 43(a)'s application should be limited to claims
similar in nature to trademark infringement).
73. See id. at 1283-84 (concluding that "disparagement of the plaintiffs product... does
not come within the purview of [Section 43(a) of] the Lanham Act").
74. See Tepper, supra note 61, at 959 ("Oddly enough, courts retained the Bernardrule
that only false statements about a defendant's own product were actionable under Section 43(a),
though courts later abandoned the underlying rationale that Section 43(a) claims should be
limited to trademark-type violations.").
75. See infra Part IV (discussing the different standing requirements which each circuit
placed on plaintiffs in Section 43(a) false advertising claims).
76. See De Sevo, supra note 5, at 9-18 (discussing the cases that show that the circuit
courts have consistently refused to grant consumers standing to bring Section 43(a) false
advertising claims).
77. See Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 691-92 (2d Cir. 1971)
(finding that consumers do not have standing to bring false advertising claims under Section
43(a)). In Colligan,the plaintiffs, a group ofhigh school students, sued a ski tour company that
had advertised that its trips included ski equipment for each tour participant, qualified skiing
instruction, and safe and reliable transportation to the ski resort. Id. at 687. When the plaintiffs
went on their ski trip, the defendant only provided them with sufficient skiing equipment for
approximately half of their party. Id. at 688. Furthermore, the defendant only provided one
qualified ski instructor, who did very little teaching while the plaintiffs were on the ski slopes,
and several of the defendant's buses had various mechanical difficulties that affected the
plaintiffs' trips to and from the ski resort. Id. The Second Circuit acknowledged that if read in
isolation, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act conferred standing upon the plaintiffs to make a false
advertising claim. Id. at 689. The court, however, ultimately found that the plaintiffs did not
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In Colligan,the Second Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the
legislative history of Section 43(a) showed that Congress intended to grant
consumers standing. 78 The court found that Section 43(a)'s legislative history
was "inconclusive and therefore of little or no help in resolving the issue [of
whether consumers have standing to sue under Section 43(a)'s false advertising
protection]. 7 9 The court, therefore, turned to the congressional purpose stated
within the Lanham Act. That is, the court referred to Section 45, which
states: "The intent of this chapter is... to protect persons engaged in
commerce against unfair competition."' The court reasoned that because
Section 45 made no mention of protecting consumers, Congress did not intend
for the Lanham Act to directly protect consumers.8 2 Consumers, therefore,
could not bring a false advertising suit under Section 43(a). 3 Other courts soon
followed the Colligan court's rationale, s4 and it eventually became widely
accepted among the courts that a plaintiff whose only relationship to a
defendant was that of a consumer could not bring a false advertising claim
under Section 43(a). 5

have standing to pursue their claim because when Section 43(a) is read in conjunction with
Section 45, Congress's intent to limit standing to a commercial class of plaintiffs becomes clear.
Id. at 691-92.
78. See id. at 690 (rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the legislative history of the
Lanham Act is evidence that Congress intended to grant consumers standing to make false
advertising claims under Section 43(a)).
79. Id.
80. See id. at 691 ("The congressional statement of purpose of the [Lanham] Act is
contained in § 45.").
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
82. Colligan, 442 F.2d at 691.
83. See id. (finding that Section 43(a) was not intended to protect consumers). The
Second Circuit stated:
We conclude.., that Congress'[s] purpose in enacting § 43(a) was to create a
special and limited unfair competition remedy, virtually without regard for the
interests of consumers generally and almost certainly without any consideration of
consumer rights of action in particular. The Act's purpose, as defined in § 45, is
exclusively to protect the interests of a purely commercial class against
unscrupulous commercial conduct.
Id.
84. See Courtland L. Reichman & M. Melissa Cannady, False Advertising Under the
Lanham Act, 21 FRANCHISE L.J. 187, 192 (2002) (stating that courts "generally root" their
conclusion that consumers do not have standing to bring a Section 43(a) claim in the language
of Section 45).
85. See id.("[C]ourts almost universally hold that the Lanham Act requires some showing
of a potential for commercial or competitive injury [for a plaintiff to have standing].").
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D. 1988 CongressionalRevision of Section 43(a)
In 1988, Congress sought to amend Section 43(a) as part of the Trademark
Law Revision Act.86 Congress considered two major changes to Section
43(a)-explicitly permitting false advertising actions concerning
misrepresentations of a plaintiff's product and explicitly granting standing to
consumers.8 7 There was little to no disagreement on the former proposed
change, 88 and when passed, the Trademark Law Revision Act modified Section
43(a) in a manner that permitted false advertising claims to be made regardless
of whether the alleged misrepresentations concerned the defendant's product or
the plaintiff's product. 89 The latter proposed change, however, sparked
considerable debate.
The original Senate bill that eventually became the Trademark Law
Revision Act contained a provision that explicitly denied consumers standing to
make claims under Section 43(a). 90 When the Senate eventually passed the bill,
however, the provision had been eliminated, and the portion of Section 43(a)
concerning standing remained in its original form. 91 The original House bill
86. See Tepper, supra note 61, at 957 (stating that in 1988, Congress passed the
Trademark Law Revision Act, which amongst other things, amended Section 43(a)). For more
information on the passage of the Trademark Law Revision Act, see S. REP. No. 100-515
(1988), as reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577; H.R. REP. No. 100-1028 (1988); 134 CONG.
REc. 32,052-56 (1988); 134 CONG. REc. 31,842-61 (1988).
87. See Tepper, supra note 61, at 957-58 (stating that Congress considered revisions to
Section 43(a) that would clarify consumer standing and overturn "a line ofjudicial opinions that
limited false advertising actions under Section 43(a) to false statements about a defendant's own
products").
88. See id. at 960 (stating that both the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Trademark
Review Commission agreed that the Bernard limitation on Section 43(a) false advertising
claims should be lifted).
89. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2000) (imposing liability on those who misrepresent
"the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's
goods, services, or commercial activities"); 5 McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 49,
§ 27:10 (stating that as amended by the Trademark Law Revision Act, Section 43(a) "covers not
only false representations about the defendant's own goods and services, but false
representations about the plaintiff's goods and services as well"); Tepper, supra note 61, at 958
("As amended [by the Trademark Law Revision Act], Section 43(a) allows an action for false
advertising about one's own or another person's goods or services.").
90. See 133 CONG. REc. 32,816 (1987) (proposing a change to Section 43(a) that would
limit standing to bring a claim under the section to "any person who believes that he is or is
likely to be damaged in his business or profession by such action").
91. See S. REP. No. 100-515, at 41(1988), asreprintedin1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577,5604
(stating that the committee had decided to modify the bill so that Section 43(a)'s standing
provision would not be changed); Tepper, supra note 61, at 963 ("[B]y the time the Senate
passed the bill [that would become the Trademark Law Revision Act] in May of 1988, the
language of [the standing provision] of Section 43(a) had been returned to its original form.").
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also contained a provision that explicitly prohibited consumer standing in
Section 43(a) claims.92 The House, however, later removed that provision from
its bill and replaced it with a provision that clearly granted consumers standing
to pursue Section 43(a) claims.93 With differing bills in the Senate and the
House, a joint conference committee formed to amend the bills so that they
corresponded with one another. 94 The joint conference committee eliminated
the provision in the House's bill that explicitly gave consumers standing and
produced a bill that made no changes to Section 43(a)'s standing provision. 9'
What these changes in the bills that became the Trademark Law Revision
Act said about Congress's intent was in the eye of the beholder. 96 The House
Report stated that the deletion of its provision explicitly granting consumer
standing was due to the fact that such a provision was unnecessary as "[t]he
plain meaning of the statute already includes consumers, since it grants any
'person' the right to sue." 97 At least one member of the House, however,
clearly disagreed with the report's explanation for why the House deleted the
consumer standing provision; Congressman Fish stated that the House removed
the provision because it "would have radically altered the nature of the Lanham
Act and would have had the likely effect of turning the [flederal courts into a
small claims court."' 98 Furthermore, the Senate committee report stated that the
lack of a change in the standing provision of Section 43(a) should be
considered a decision to maintain the status quo in regards to standing

92. See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988: Hearing on H.R. 4156 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 100th Cong. 79 (1988) (statement of Ronald S. Kareken, President, United States
Trademark Association) (stating that H.R. 4156, the original House bill to revise the Lanham
Act, contains a provision that limits standing to make a claim under Section 43(a) to those
whose business or professional interests are injured by the alleged violation).
93. See H.R. REP. No. 100-1028, at 7 (1988) (stating that the bill the committee is
presenting makes it explicit that consumers do have standing to sue under Section 43(a)).
94. See Tepper, supra note 61, at 964. ("Because the House and Senate bills differed, a
joint meeting was called to harmonize them.").
95. See Scott E. Thompson, ConsumerStanding UnderSection 43(a): More Legislative
History,More Confusion, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 341, 351 (1989) (stating that a compromise was
reached in the joint meeting that resulted in the retention of Section 43(a)'s original standing

provision).
96. See Tepper, supra note 61, at 964 ("Subsequent statements made by the drafters [of
the Trademark Law Revision Act] do little to clarify [the compromise which resulted in the
retention of Section 43(a)'s original standing provision].").
97. 134 CONG. REc. 31,852 (1988) (citing H.R. REP. No. 100-1028, at 13-15).
98. Id. at 31,854.
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determinations in Section 43(a) claims. 99
committee stated:

In its own words, the Senate

It is the committee's intention that... standing under Section 43(a) ...
should continue to be decided on a case-by-case basis, and that the
amendments.., made to the legislation with respect to this issue [deleting
the proposed amendment which would have prohibited consumer standing]
not be regarded as either limiting or extending applicable decisional
should
l°°
law.
In short, the Trademark Law Revision Act did little to help courts
determine a proper standard for determining which plaintiffs should be granted
standing in Section 43(a) claims.' 0' As a result, following passage of the
Trademark Law Revision Act, the standards for Section 43(a) standing
02
with
continue to differ, sometimes significantly, from one circuit to0 another'
3
claims.'
43(a)
Section
bring
cannot
one constant-consumers

IV. The Different Standardsfor DeterminingPrudentialStanding
The current standards for Section 43(a) standing can be grouped into three
categories. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits take the categorical approach. The
First and Second Circuits apply a reasonable interests test. Finally, the Third,
Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits use a five-prong test that is commonly referred to
as the Conte Bros. test, a reference to the case in which the Third Circuit
developed the test.

99. See De Sevo, supra note 5, at 6 (explaining that the Senate committee report stated
that the Trademark Revision Act and its legislative history should have no impact on judicial
decisions regarding consumer standing to make Section 43(a) claims).
100.

S.REp. No. 100-515, at 41 (1988), as reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5604.

101. See Tepper, supra note 61, at 963 ("If courts found the history of the 1946 Lanham
Act to be frustrating, they are almost certain to be driven to despair by the history of the
Trademark Law Revision Act.").
102. See infra Part IV (discussing the different standing requirements that each circuit
placed on plaintiffs in Section 43(a) false advertising claims).
103. See Reichman & Cannady, supra note 84, at 192 ("[C]ourts almost universally hold

that the Lanham Act requires some showing of a potential for commercial or competitive injury
[for a plaintiff to have standing].").
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A. The CategoricalApproach

In jurisdictions that use the categorical approach, a plaintiff in a Section
43(a) false advertising claim"' 4 has standing only if he or she is a direct
competitor of the defendant. 0 5 In adopting this standard, the Tenth Circuit
relied on Section 45's statement of congressional purpose.' ° 6 The court
reasoned that because Section 45 states that the intent of the Lanham Act is to
prevent unfair competition, the plaintiff"must be a competitor ofthe defendant
and allege a competitive injury" to invoke Section 43(a)'s false advertising
protection.'07
The Ninth Circuit also turned to Section 45's statement of purpose when
adopting the categorical approach.
In Halicki v. United Artists
Communications, Inc., °8 the court found that Section 45 made it clear that
Section 43(a) "is directed against unfair competition," and that, therefore, to
have a false advertising cause of action under Section 43(a) the conduct in
question "must not only be unfair but must in some discernible way be
competitive."'10 9 While requiring that the tortious conduct in some discernible
way be competitive appears to be not as stringent as the Tenth Circuit's clear
statement that a Section 43(a) false advertising plaintiff must be a competitor,
the language has had the same effect as the Tenth Circuit's standard. That is, it
has prevented anyone but direct competitors from bringing Section 43(a) false
advertising claims." 0
104. Jurisdictions using the categorical approach make a distinction between false
advertising claims brought under Section 43(a) (claims alleging false representations concerning
the quality of goods) and false association claims brought under Section 43(a) (claims alleging
false representations concerning the origin or endorsement of goods). "For a false advertising
claim... the plaintiff 'must be a competitor of the defendant and allege a competitive injury;'
for a false association claim ...the plaintiff must allege a 'reasonable interest to be protected'
in the subject goods or services, or in the misused mark causing a misidentification."
Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 211 F.3d 515, 520 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Stanfield v. Osborne Indus.,
Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 873 (10th Cir. 1995)).
105.

See Lawrence Weinstein & Alexander Kaplan, Barring Direct Competitorfrom

Standingto Claim FalseAdvertising, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 1, 2007, at S6 (explaining the categorical
approach).
106. See Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 873 (10th Cir. 1995) ("A false
advertising claim implicates the Lanham Act's purpose of preventing unfair competition.").
107. Id.
108. See Halicki v. United Artists Commc'n, Inc., 812 F.2d 1213, 1214 (9th Cir. 1987)
(finding that the defendant must be in competition with the plaintiff for the plaintiff to have
standing to bring a false advertising claim under Section 43(a)).
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Jack Russell Terrier Network ofN. Cal. v. Am. Kennel Club, 407 F.3d 1027,
1037 (9th Cir. 2005) (refusing to grant standing in a Section 43(a) false advertising claim to a
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B. The Reasonable Interest Test
While the jurisdictions that use the reasonable interest test apply the test in
slightly different manners, the basic requirement of the test is that the plaintiff
"has a reasonable interest in being protected against [the alleged] false
advertising.""' When the First Circuit adopted this test as its standard for
standing in Section 43(a) false advertising claims, the court asserted that the
standard was appropriate because "the Lanham Act was intended to enlarge the
category of activities proscribed by federal law at the time of its enactment in
1946" 112 and there was a "general consensus [among courts] that the
plaintiff... [did] not have to be a competitor in order to have standing to
sue." 113 While this second rationale is now inaccurate due to the Ninth and
Tenth Circuit's later adoption of the categorical approach,' 4 courts within the
First Circuit continue to use the reasonable interest test." 5 The First Circuit,
however, does require the plaintiff to show more than just that he or she has a
reasonable interest in being protected from the alleged advertising; the plaintiff
must also establish "a link or 'nexus' between itself and the alleged falsehood
[in the defendant's advertising]." ' 1 6 Because the court has been less than clear
as to what exactly the plaintiff must show to meet the nexus requirement, to
gain a sense of what the nexus requirement entails, one must look to the cases
where the court has had to decide whether a nexus exists between a noncompetitor plaintiff and alleged false advertising. Unfortunately, the First
Circuit has only once faced the question of whether a noncompetitor plaintiff in
a Section 43(a) false advertising claim met the nexus requirement for standing.
In Camel Hair & CashmereInstitute ofAmerica, Inc. v. AssociatedDry
Goods Corp., 1 7 the court found that manufacturers and marketers of cashmere
had a sufficient nexus with the mislabeling of coats as containing more

non-competitor plaintiff); Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468, 470 (9th Cir. 1995) (same).
111. Camel Hair & Cashmere Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 799 F.2d
6, 11 (lst Cir. 1986).
112. Quabaug Rubber Co. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., 567 F.2d 154, 160 (1st Cir. 1977).
113. Camel Hair,799 F.2d at 11.
114. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the development of the categorical approach for
determining standing in Section 43(a) false advertising claims).
115. See Landrau v. Solis Betancourt, 554 F. Supp. 2d 102, 109 (D.P.R. 2007) (using the
reasonable interest test to determine whether the plaintiff had standing to make a Section 43(a)
false advertising claim).
116. Camel Hair,799 F.2d at 11-12.
117. See id. (finding that noncompetitor plaintiffs had standing to bring a Section 43(a)
false advertising claim because they met the requirements of the reasonable interest test).

1694

65 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1673 (2008)

cashmere material than they actually did. 1 8 Camel Hairimplies that to meet
the nexus requirement, the plaintiff's business must be injured in some manner
by the alleged false advertising, but because the court has yet to state explicitly
that this is in fact what the nexus prong requires, whether a noncompetitor
plaintiff meets the First Circuit's standing requirements for Section 43(a) false
advertising claims will be questionable in each case.
The Second Circuit also requires that the plaintiff show more than just that
he or she has a reasonable interest in being protected from the defendant's false
advertising. To have standing, the plaintiff also must show that there is a
reasonable basis for concluding that his or her reasonable interest likely will be
injured by the alleged false advertising." 9 While the language of this standard
is similar to the First Circuit's requirements, the Second Circuit has described
in greater detail what its standard means. The court has stated that its
reasonable basis prong requires the plaintiff to show "both likely injury and a
causal nexus to the false advertising.' 120 Furthermore, the court has stated that
12 1
the likely injury must be of a competitive or commercial nature.
Additionally, the reasonable interest requirement includes "commercial
interests, direct pecuniary interests, and even a future potential for a
122
commercial or competitive injury."'
C. The Conte Bros. Test
In 1998, in search of "an appropriate method for adding content" 123 to the
reasonable interest test it had been applying, then-Judge Alito, writing for the
Third Circuit in Conte Bros. Automotive, Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc.,
turned to antitrust law.124 The result was a third test for determining whether a
118. See id. at 12 ("We find that the plaintiff's members do have a sufficient nexus to the
alleged wrong to sue in their own right.").
119. Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Cosprophar, Inc., 32 F.3d 690,694 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that
a plaintiff must show both a "reasonable interest" and a "reasonable basis" for believing that
such interest may be damaged in order to have standing in a Section 43(a) false advertising
claim).
120. Id.
121. See Berni v. Int'l Gourmet Rests. of Am., Inc., 838 F.2d 642, 648 (2d Cir. 1988)
("Although a Section 43 plaintiff need not be a direct competitor,.. . it is apparent that, at a
minimum, standing to bring a Section 43 claim requires the potential for a commercial or
competitive injury.").
122. ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 169 (2d Cir. 2007).
123. Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 233 (3d Cir.
1998).
124. See id. (stating that the test for antitrust standing is also an appropriate test for
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plaintiff in a Section 43(a) false advertising claim has standing. The Third
Circuit's new test came from Associated General Contractors, Inc. v.
CaliforniaState Council of Carpenters,125 a case where the U.S. Supreme
Court developed a test to determine whether a plaintiff had standing to make a
claim under Section 4 of the Clayton Act. 26 Pointing to McCarthy on
Trademarks and Unfair Competition' 27 and the Restatement (Third) Unfair
Competition 28 for support, the Third Circuit found that the Supreme Court's
Associated General test was also appropriate for determining whether a
plaintiff in a Section 43(a) false advertising claim has standing to sue. 129 This
rationale has proved to be popular as in the last few years both the Fifth 30 and
Eleventh13 1 Circuits have decided to adopt this test, which when applied in
Section 43(a) false advertising claims has become known as the Conte Bros.
test. 132
The test contains five factors for courts to consider when addressing a
plaintiff s prudential standing in a Section 43(a) false advertising claim. First,
the court should ask whether the plaintiffs injury is of a type that Congress
sought to remedy with Section 43(a). 133 Second, the court should consider the
extent to which the plaintiffs injury directly resulted from the defendant's
standing in Section 43(a) false advertising claims).
125. See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 545 (1983) (listing factors that courts should consider when determining whether a plaintiff
has standing to bring an antitrust violation claim under Section 4 of the Clayton Act).
126. See id. (stating the factors the Court used to determine whether the plaintiff had
standing to make a claim under Section 4 of the Clayton Act).
127. See5 McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 49, § 27:32 n.1 (advocating the use of
a test for standing in Section 43(a) claims that is similar to the test used for antitrust standing).
128. See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) UNFAIR COMPETrON § 3 cmt. f(1995) (advocating the use
of a test for standing in Section 43(a) claims that is similar to the test used for antitrust
standing).
129. See Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221,233 (3d Cir.
1998) (adopting the test for antitrust standing developed in Associated Generalfor determining
standing in Section 43(a) claims).
130. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 562-63 (5th Cir. 2001)
(adopting the Conte Bros. test for determining whether a plaintiff has standing to make a
Section 43(a) claim).
131. See Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1167 (11th Cir.
2007) (adopting the Conte Bros. test for determining whether a plaintiff has standing to make a
Section 43(a) claim).
132. See Eleventh Circuit Adopts Conte Bros. Test, Denies Rival Standing Against
McDonald's, 76 U.S.L.W. 1015, 1015 (July 3, 2007) (referring to the Third Circuit's current
test for standing in Section 43(a) claims as the Conte Bros. test).
133. See Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 233 (stating that the first factor of the test is whether
Congress intended to remedy the harm the plaintiff is alleging).
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alleged Section 43(a) violation. 134 Third, the proximity of the plaintiff in
relation to the defendant's alleged false advertising should be noted.13 ' Fourth,
136
the court should look at how speculative the plaintiffs damages claim is.
Fifth and finally, the court should consider the risk of duplicative damages
and/or how
complex it will be to apportion damages among potential
137
plaintiffs.
How exactly the Conte Bros. factors should be weighed is not apparent.
Can one factor pointing heavily towards granting standing outweigh the other
four factors pointing against a grant of standing, or must at least three factors
point towards a grant of standing for a Section 43(a) claim to survive? In Conte
Bros., this issue was irrelevant because the court found that all five factors
pointed away from granting standing. 138 In the case in which it adopted the
Conte Bros. test, the Fifth Circuit also found that all five factors pointed against
a grant of standing. 3 9 The Eleventh Circuit, however, did have to address this
issue when it adopted the Conte Bros. test, and while not stating that it was
necessary for three factors to weigh towards granting standing for a plaintiff to
have standing, it found that the plaintiff in the case at hand did not have
standing because only two factors pointed towards standing existing. 40 The
Eleventh Circuit's application is anything but definitive, and therefore, if the
Conte Bros. test continues to proliferate among the circuit courts, the courts
eventually will have to decide how exactly the five factors should be weighed.

134. See id. (stating that the second factor of the test is "the directness or indirectness of the
asserted injury").
135. See id. (stating that the third factor of the test is "the proximity or remoteness of the
party to the alleged injurious conduct").
136. See id. (stating that the fourth factor of the test is "the speculativeness of the damages
claim").
137. See id. (stating that the final factor of the test is "the risk of duplicative damages or
complexity in apportioning damages").
138. See id. at 234-35 (finding that each factor of the test weighs against granting the
plaintiffs standing).
139. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539,564 (5th Cir. 2001) ("This
analysis [applying the Conte Bros. test] shows that all five factors unanimously... counsel
against granting standing in this circumstance.").
140. See Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1173 (1Ith Cir.
2007) ("[T]he first and third Conte Bros. factors weigh in favor of prudential standing, while the
second, fourth, and fifth factors weigh against prudential standing. Admittedly it is a close
question, but we conclude that on balance, Phoenix does not have prudential standing to bring
its claim against McDonald's.").
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V. Why a New UniversalStandardis Necessary
The existence of three different standards for prudential standing in
Section 43(a) false advertising claims creates two major concerns. First, having
many different standards causes uncertainty in every court. Additionally, the
fact that the standard varies from one circuit to another encourages forum
shopping. Both of these problems are discussed in more detail in this Part.
After the intricacies of these problems are articulated, the need for the
establishment of a definitive standard becomes apparent.
A. Many Different Standards Create Too Much Uncertainty
One of the largest problems with the existence of different standards
among the circuits is that it creates uncertainty in all the circuits. In circuits
that have yet to address the issue, the uncertainty is obvious. For instance, in
the opening hypothetical, counsel for Giuseppe's cannot make a reliable
prediction as to whether or not the district court will grant standing because the
standard upon which the court will make its ruling is unpredictable until the
court renders its decision. That is, under the current status of Section 43(a)
standing jurisprudence, no one can predict what a circuit court that has yet to
confront the issue (or a district court located within a circuit that has yet to
confront the issue) will do because the persuasive authority at which the court
will look before rendering its decision is all over the map. Furthermore, the
fact that there is no consensus on the issue arguably makes it more likely that
the court will reject the three existing standards and create a new standard of its
own. Additionally, even in circuits that have adopted a standard for standing in
Section 43(a) false advertising claims, whether or not a party will be granted
standing is still somewhat unpredictable because the issue is so unsettled
nationwide that a circuit may be willing to change its standard.
The Third Circuit's Section 43(a) standing jurisprudence supports this
theory. In a span of less than two decades, the Third Circuit articulated three
4
different standards for standing in Section 43(a) false advertising claims.1 '
141. Compare Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221,233
(3d Cir. 1998) (establishing a five-part test for determining a litigant's prudential standing in
claims arising under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act), with Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l Corp., 11
F.3d 1163, 1177 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that in order to bring a claim under Section 43(a) a
party must be a direct competitor of the alleged false advertiser or a "particularly appropriate
standard bearer" for the commercial interests harmed by the alleged false advertising), and
Thorn v. Reliance Van Co., 736 F.2d 929, 933 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that standing should be
based on whether the party has a reasonable interest in being protected from false advertising).
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Initially, the court took an extremely permissive approach, finding that standing
should depend on whether the plaintiff has a reasonable interest in seeking
protection from the defendant's alleged false advertising.' 42 Nine years later,
the same court had a turnaround and took a much more restrictive approach,
finding that to have standing, a plaintiff must be a direct competitor of the
defendant or a "particularly appropriate standard bearer" for the commercial
interests that the alleged false advertising harmed. 4 A mere five years after
that decision, the court found that standard to be too restrictive and became the
first circuit to adopt the five-part Conte Bros. test previously discussed. 144 In
each of these cases, the court seems more willing than usual to distinguish its
prior rulings and to dismiss cases from other circuits as incorrect. 145 One could
argue that this emboldening of the court is because the issue is so unsettled that
they can deviate from already established rules without being labeled a
maverick court.146
In short, the lack of consensus on this standing issue seems to make judges
more willing to act as trailblazers, and this increased willingness to veer from
previously stated standards makes it nearly impossible for potential litigants to
know whether or not they can make a-Section 43(a) false advertising claim.
This uncertainty defeats one of the primary purposes of standing requirements,
which is to promote judicial efficiency by limiting the number of cases on the
courts' dockets. 147 If the standard for standing is uncertain, then all litigants
who think they might under some theory have a false advertising claim under
Section 43(a) will file their claim with the reasonable hope that the court will
142.

See Thorn, 736 F.2d at 933 (stating that standing should be based on whether the

party has a reasonable interest in being protected from false advertising).
143. Serbin, 11 F.3dat 1177.
144. See Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 233 (establishing a five-part test for determining a
litigant's prudential standing in claims arising under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act).
145. See id. at 232 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit's categorical approach); Serbin, 11 F.3d at
1177 (distinguishing Thorn and ignoring its focus on the plain meaning of Section 43(a)'s
statutory standing provision); Thorn, 736 F.2d at 932 (rejecting the Second Circuit's Colligan
decision "to the extent that it is contrary to the plain meaning rule").
146. Professors Scott Meinke and Kevin Scott argue thatjudges' decisions are impacted by
their desire to obtain the respect of fellow judges. See Scott R. Meinke & Kevin M. Scott,
CollegialInfluence andJudicial Voting Change: The Effect of Membership Change on US.
Supreme Court Justices, 41 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 909, 910 ("Judges are concerned about the
esteem of their colleagues.., and may alter their behavior in order to secure respect.").
Following this theory, a judge is more likely to create a new test or standard when no existing
test or standard is widely accepted because doing so will probably not impact the level of

respect they receive from other judges.
147. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 58 ("[S]tanding is said to serve judicial efficiency
by preventing a flood of lawsuits by those who have only an ideological stake in the outcome.").
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adopt their theory as the new standard for standing. In this way, the lack of a
consistently applied judicial standard for standing does little to promote judicial
efficiency.
B. Different StandardsAmong the CircuitsEncourageForum Shopping
Forum shopping is another problem that arises from the existence of three
different standards for Section 43(a) standing. 148 In the opening hypothetical,
assuming the Ninth and Tenth Circuits could exercise personal jurisdiction over
Carlo's, counsel for Giuseppe's should have filed in a district court in the Ninth
or Tenth Circuit because a court in those circuits probably would have applied
the categorical approach, and Giuseppe's, as a direct competitor of Carlo's,
definitely would have had standing to make a Section 43(a) false advertising
claim.' 49 If Giuseppe's, however, had filed in a district court located in the
Third or Eleventh Circuit, then its standing would be less clear as the multifactor ConteBros. test probably would be applied. The fact that whether or not
Giuseppe's can make a claim is at least partially dependent on where
Giuseppe's files its claim means that the current status of Section 43(a) false
advertising standing jurisprudence encourages forum shopping. The U.S.
Supreme Court has stated that it will not interpret a statute in a manner which
encourages forum shopping and that a federal law's enforceability should not
depend on the forum in which a claim is brought.150 Under Section 43(a)'s
current jurisprudence, however, whether a plaintiff can enforce a Section 43(a)
false advertising claim does depend on where the plaintiff files his or her claim,
and therefore, it is necessary for the Supreme Court to establish a clear,
universal standard for determining whether a plaintiff has standing to make a
false advertising claim under Section 43(a).

148. But see Richard Maloy, Forum Shopping? What's Wrong With That?, 24 QUINNIIAc
L. REV. 25, 59-60 (2005) (highlighting the fact that forum shopping is not always viewed as
problematic, such as when it takes the form of choice of law and forum choice provisions in

contracts).
149. This also is assuming that conflicts of laws rules would have no impact on the
standard for standing that the Ninth or Tenth Circuit would apply.
150. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15 (1984) ("We are unwilling to attribute to
Congress the intent ... to create a right ... and yet make the right dependent for its enforcement
on the particular forum in which it is asserted.").
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VI. What the New Universal StandardShould Be

As the legislative history of the Trademark Law Revision Act makes
apparent,' 5 ' the likelihood of Congress agreeing, anytime soon, on a
clarification of Section 43(a)'s standing provision that would result in a
universally applied standard for standing in Section 43(a) false advertising
claims is low. The U.S. Supreme Court is, therefore, potential Section 43(a)
plaintiffs' best hope for a universal standard being adopted in the near future.
Resolution of this issue from the high court is also appropriate as prudential
standing limitations are judicially created, 52 and as the problem regarding
Section 43(a) standing concerns only prudential limitations, 53 one could argue
that the judiciary created this problem. 5 In other words, the judiciary created
this mess, and the judiciary, therefore, should be the one to clean it. Hopefully,
the U.S. Supreme Court will confront the Section 43(a) standing problem soon,
but if the Court takes on the issue, the question then becomes the following:
What should the universal standard be for determining whether a plaintiff has
standing to sue for false advertising under Section 43(a)?
A. Not Another Malleable Standard!
When choosing a universal standard, the Court should avoid standards like
the reasonable interest test and the Conte Bros. test because adopting these
standards would not alleviate the current problems that exist with Section 43(a)
false advertising standing. The reasonable interest test and the ConteBros. test
give so much discretion to judges that the application of both standards likely
would vary from one court to another. For example, courts likely would vary in
their definition of a reasonable interest or in the controlling weight they placed
on each prong of the Conte Bros. test. In short, the uncertainty and
encouragement of forum shopping that currently exists as a result of the use of
151. See supra Part III.D (stating that various congressional representatives and senators
debated how to change Section 43's standing provision to make it more clear and when they
could not agree on how to change it, they decided to leave it untouched).
152. See CHEMERINSKY, supranote 7, at 60 (stating that prudential standing principles are
not constitutionally imposed, but judicially imposed as part of "prudent judicial
administration").
153. See Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221,225 (3d Cir.
1998) (stating that prudential standing concerns, rather than constitutional standing concerns,
could prevent the plaintiff from making a Section 43(a) false advertising claim).
154. See Pierce, supra note 8, at 1786-87 (arguing that standing law as a whole is currently
in a "sad state" and that because the judiciary created standing law, it is the judiciary's "sole
responsibility to reduce the problems inherent in modem standing law").
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three different standards would continue to exist if the Supreme Court adopted
the reasonable interest test or Conte. Bros. test because the malleability of these
standards would make the occurrence of new circuit splits on issues involving
their application likely.
Already, the circuits that have adopted the Conte Bros. test have differed
significantly in their application of it. In ConteBros., the Third Circuit, while
rejecting the categorical approach' 55 and the notion that the mere fact that any
competition occurred between the plaintiff and the defendant would give the
plaintiff standing, 56 implied that the new standard that it was adopting was
meant to expand the class of eligible Section 43(a) false advertising plaintiffs
beyond direct competitors. 57 In other words, the Third Circuit presented the
Conte Bros. test as a standard that was more permissive than the categorical
approach. When, however, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the Conte Bros. test as
its standard for standing in Section 43(a) false advertising claims, it applied the
test in a manner which prevented a Burger King franchisee from suing
McDonald's under Section 43(a) for alleged false advertising. 58 As
McDonald's is the epitome of a direct competitor to Burger King and certainly
competes with Burger King in more than just a limited sense, the Eleventh
Circuit applied the Conte Bros. test in a manner that made it more restrictive
than the categorical approach.
Another concern that would arise with the adoption of the reasonable
interest test or the Conte Bros. test as the universal standard is that both tests
give judges a large amount of discretion, and judges could use this discretion to
arrive at an outcome not rooted in prudential standing principles, but instead
based on the merits of the plaintiff's case. 159 That is, judges could use these
highly discretionary tests to prevent claims which they perceive as having little
merit (but a sufficient amount to prevent the court from dismissing the claim 6at
sumnmaryjudgment on its merits) from moving forward in the litigation process. 1
155. See Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 231 (rejecting the district court's approach, which was
the categorical approach).
156. See id. at 235 (stating that the court's decision to deny standing would not change
even if it assumed that some percentage of the plaintiff's sales occurred in a manner which made
the plaintiff a competitor of the defendant in "some limited sense").
157. See id. at 230 (quoting Thorn positively to state that a non-competitor could have
standing to bring a false advertising claim under Section 43(a)).
158. See Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1173 (1 lth Cir.
2007) (finding that the plaintiff, a Burger King franchisee, did not have prudential standing to
make a Section 43(a) false advertising claim against McDonald's).
159. See Pierce, supra note 8, at 1742-43 (arguing that judges use standing doctrine to
support parties that further their "political and ideological agendas").
160. See id. at 1743 (stating that when standing doctrines are so malleable, it is easy for
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The findings of Professor Richard J. Pierce, Jr. lend credibility to this concern.
Pierce examined five Supreme Court standing cases heard between 1991 and 1998
and found a "strong convergence between the ideological preferences of the Justices
and their voting pattems. 16 1 Pierce asserts that in the five cases he examined, "[a]
political scientist with no knowledge of the law of standing would have had no
difficulty predicting the outcome of each case and predicting thirty-one ofthe thirtythree votes cast by Justices with clear ideological preferences, based solely on his
knowledge of the ideological preferences of the Justices."'162 Furthermore, Pierce
found that judicial manipulation of malleable standing principles to rationalize an
outcome that meets the judge's ideological preferences is not limited to Supreme
Court Justices. Pierce examined all the circuit court cases considering the standing
of environmental plaintiffs that were decided between January 1, 1993 and May 1,
1998 and found that "Republican judges voted to deny standing to environmental
plaintiffs in 43.5% of cases, while Democratic judges voted to deny standing to
environmental plaintiffs in only 11.1% of cases."163 Based on this finding, Pierce
stated that he was "able to reject the hypothesis that decisionmaking in standing
cases is not influenced by a judge's political affiliation at the 99% confidence
level."'164 Pierce's work supports the notion that a highly malleable standard, such
as the reasonable interest test or the ConteBros. test, should not be adopted as the
universal standard for determining whether a plaintiff has standing to make a
Section 43(a) false advertising claim. Pierce's findings suggest that adopting an
easily malleable standard would create a high risk that courts would make Section
43(a) standing determinations based not on prudential standing principles, but rather
on whether the
merits of the plaintiff's claim align with their ideological
165
preferences.
B. The Simple Solution (At Leastfor Direct Competitors): A Categorical
Approach Filter
As it is unclear whether Congress intended to allow parties who are not direct
competitors to bring false advertising claims under Section 43(a), it may be
judges to manipulate the doctrines "to rationalize their... preferred results").
161. Id.at 1754.
162. Id. at 1754-55.
163. Id.at 1760.
164. Id.
165. See id.
at 1745 (stating that a judge's decision is more likely to turn on his political
preference when the doctrine that applies to the matter at hand is "relatively indeterminate" or
malleable).
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appropriate for courts to continue to use the reasonable interest and/or Conte Bros.
tests to evaluate whether plaintiffs who are not direct competitors have standing,
despite the aforementioned flaws of those tests. Congress's intent to confer standing
upon direct competitors to make such claims, however, is clearer, 66 and therefore, a
universal adoption of the categorical approach as a filter would be appropriate. That
is, courts should apply a two-step test when evaluating a plaintiff's standing in
Section 43(a) false advertising claims. First, the court should apply the categorical
approach. If the court determines that the plaintiff is a direct competitor of the
alleged false advertiser, then the court's evaluation should stop, and the court should
grant standing to the plaintiff. If the court determines that the plaintiff is not a direct
competitor, then the court could choose to move to a second step where it would
apply the 67reasonable interest or Conte Bros. tests to evaluate the plaintiffs
standing.1

1. Why the FilterIs an AppropriateSolution
A universal adoption of the categorical approach 168 as a filter for deciding
standing issues in Section 43(a) false advertising claims would end the current
166. See infra Part VI.B.1 (discussing how the text of Section 43(a) and Section 45,
considered together, make a congressional intent to grant standing to direct competitors
evident).
167. One could make an argument that standing in Section 43(a) false advertising claims
should not extend beyond direct competitors. See, e.g., Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 52
F.3d 867, 873 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding that a plaintiff must be a direct competitor to bring a
false advertising claim under Section 43(a)); Halicki v. United Artists Commc'n, Inc., 812 F.2d
1213, 1214 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that the defendant must be a competitor of the plaintiff for a
plaintiff to have standing to make a Section 43(a) false advertising claim). One, however, also
could argue that courts should extend standing to bring such claims beyond direct competitors.
See, e.g., Joint Stock Soc'y v. UDV N. Am., Inc., 266 F.3d 164, 180 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that
a non-competitor who had commercial interests that were harmed by the alleged false
advertising would have standing to make a claim under Section 43(a)); Camel Hair & Cashmere
Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 799 F.2d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 1986) (finding that
the plaintiff in a Section 43(a) false advertising claim "does not have to be a competitor in order
to have standing to sue"); Bums, supra note 50, at 888 (advocating an extension of Section
43(a) false advertising standing to consumers). The resolution of this dispute, however, is
beyond the scope of this Note. Furthermore, this Note takes no position on what standard for
standing should be used to evaluate whether a plaintiff who is not a direct competitor can bring
a false advertising claim under Section 43(a).
168. While this Note advocates for the universal implementation of a standard for standing
in Section 43(a) false advertising claims that includes the use of the categorical approach as an
initial step, the author takes no position on whether courts also should adopt the distinction that
the categorical approach makes between false advertising claims and false association claims.
This distinction has been criticized. See, e.g., Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50,
Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 232 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Section 43(a) provides no support for drawing a
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uncertainty regarding direct competitors' standing and decrease the encouragement
of forum shopping that current Section 43(a) false advertising jurisprudence creates.
Furthermore, it would not be as susceptible to judicial manipulation as the
reasonable interest and ConteBros.tests. The categorical approach is a simple test.
Whether the plaintiff has standing hinges merely on whether he or she is a direct
competitor of the alleged false advertiser, and deciding whether a plaintiffis a direct
competitor is a much more factual determination than deciding whether a plaintiff
has a reasonable interest or meets a sufficient number of prongs of the Conte Bros.
69
test.

1

For instance, Giuseppe's is clearly a direct competitor of Carlo's, and a
Burger King franchisee is obviously a direct competitor of McDonald's. It is
less clear, however, whether Giuseppe's and the Burger King franchisee have a
reasonable interest or meet enough prongs of the Conte Bros. test. This
simplicity of the categorical approach prevents courts from varying in their
application of the standard to such an extent that different standards for directcompetitor plaintiffs begin to exist in different jurisdictions; the categorical
approach's simplicity also decreases the likelihood that courts will manipulate
the standard to arrive at results that satisfy their ideological preferences. 7 0 The
U.S. Supreme Court, therefore, should adopt a universal standard for deciding
whether or not a plaintiff has standing to bring a false advertising claim under
Section 43(a) that includes a categorical approach filter.

distinction in standing depending on the type of§ 43(a) violation alleged."); James S. Wrona,
False Advertising and Consumer Standing Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: Broad
Consumer ProtectionLegislationor a Narrow Pro-CompetitiveMeasure?, 47 RUTGERS L. REv.
1085, 1138 (1995) ("The Ninth Circuit should apply the same criteria when reviewing standing
under both Section 43(a) subparts."). Whether, despite the criticisms, such a distinction should
be adopted is beyond the scope of this Note. This Note merely argues that the standard that the
categorical approach implements for determining whether a plaintiff has standing in Section
43(a) false advertising claims, one whose outcome turns on whether the plaintiff is a direct
competitor, should be a component of a universal standard for evaluating a plaintiff's standing
in Section 43(a) false advertising claims.
169. One could certainly argue that courts could define "direct competitor" in some
complicated way so that the categorical approach would cause the same problems as the
reasonable interest or Conte Bros. tests. The more definite a standard is, however, the less likely
courts are to manipulate it. See Pierce, supra note 8, at 1745 (stating that judges are less likely
to veer from an established standard to achieve a desired outcome if the standard is
determinate). As a direct competitor is a less nebulous term than reasonable interest or the
many terms used in the prongs of the Conte Bros. test, judicial complication of a categorical
approach filter is less likely to occur.
170. See id. at 1776 (suggesting that the simplification of tests for standing would make
judges less likely to manipulate standing tests to reach decisions that match their ideological
preferences).
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A categorical approach filter also is appropriate because it ensures that the
parties upon which Congress clearly intended to confer standing are granted
standing. When one looks at the seemingly expansive language of Section
43(a)'s "any person" standing provision and Section 45's statement that the act
is meant to protect against "unfair competition," it becomes apparent that while
arguably Congress may have intended to protect more than just direct
competitors from false advertising, it, at the very least, intended to protect
direct competitors from false advertising.17 ' When courts apply highly
malleable standards like the reasonable interest or ConteBros. tests, then they
are able to prevent direct competitors from making false advertising claims
under Section 43(a).172 In this way, the adoption of a categorical approach filter
as part of a universal standard for determining whether a plaintiff has standing
to bring a Section 43(a) false advertising claim ensures that courts follow
congressional intent.
VII. Conclusion
Section 43(a) false advertising standing jurisprudence is currently in a
state of disarray for which the judiciary is largely responsible. For this reason,
the U.S. Supreme Court, in the near future, should grant certiorari to a case that
will allow it to set a universal standard for determining whether a plaintiff has
standing to bring a false advertising claim under Section 43(a). This universal
standard should include the use of the categorical approach as a filter because
the simplicity that such a filter would add would make it more difficult for
judges to manipulate the standard to arrive at a result that matches their
ideological preferences. More importantly, using the categorical approach as a
filter would ensure that direct competitors, a class of plaintiffs upon which
Congress clearly intended to confer standing, are not denied standing.

171. See Gregory Apgar, Note, PrudentialStanding Limitations on Lanham Act False
Advertising Claims, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 2389,2427 (2008) ("To deny standing to a plaintiff
alleging a commercial injury caused by the conduct of a direct competitor distorts Section
43(a)'s purpose of preventing unfair competition in commerce.").
172. See Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1173 (1 th Cir.
2007) (finding that under the Conte Bros. test, the plaintiff, a Burger King franchisee, did not
have standing to make a Section 43(a) false advertising claim against McDonald's, one of its
direct competitors).

